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ABSTRACT
Multi secret sharing is an extension of secret sharing technique
where several secrets are shared between the participants, each ac-
cording to a specified access structure.The secrets can be recon-
structed according to the access structure by participants using their
private shares.Each participant has to hold a single share, addi-
tional information are made available in a public bulletin board.The
scheme is computationally efficient and also each participant can
verify the shares of the other participants and also the recon-
structed secret.The scheme doesn’t need any secure channel also.
General Terms:
secret sharing, multi secret sharing
Keywords:
access structure, dynamic participants, cheating detection
1. INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing schemes are important tool used in security proto-
cols.Originally motivated by the problem of secure key storage by
Shamir [39], secret sharing schemes have found numerous other
applications in cryptography and distributed computing.Threshold
cryptography [14], access control [34], secure multi party compu-
tation [3] [11] [12], attribute based encryption [19] [5], generalized
oblivious transfer [45] [40], visual cryptography [33] etc., are the
significant areas where the secret sharing techniques are effectively
utilized.
In secret sharing, the secret is divided among n participants in such
a way that only designated subset of participants can recover the
secret, but any subset of participants which is not a designated set
cannot recover the secret.A set of participants who can recover the
secret is called an access structure or authorized set, and a set of
participants which is not an authorized set is called an unautho-
rized set or forbidden set. The following are the two fundamental
requirements of any secret sharing scheme.
—Recoverability:Authorized subset of participants should be able
to recover the secret by pooling their shares.
—Privacy:Unauthorized subset of participants should not learn
any information about the secret.
Let P = {Pi|i = 1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of participants and the
secret be K .The set of all secret is represented by K.The set of
all shares S1, S2, . . . , Sn is represented by S .The participants set
is partitioned into two classes.
(1) The class of authorized sets Γ is called the access structure.
(2) The class of unauthorized sets Γc = 2P \ Γ
Let as assume that P,K,S are all finite sets and there is a proba-
bility distribution on K and S . H(K) and H(S) are used to denote
the entropy of K and S respectively.
In a secret sharing scheme there is a special participant called
Dealer D /∈ P , who is trusted by everyone. The dealer chooses a
secret K ∈ K and the shares S1, S2, . . . , Sn corresponding to the
secret is generated.The shares are then distributed privately to the
participants through a secure channel. In the secret reconstruction
phase, participants of an access set pool their shares together
and recover the secret.Alternatively participants could give their
shares to a combiner to perform the computation for them.If an
unauthorized set of participants pool their shares they cannot
recover the secret.Thus a secret sharing scheme for the access
structure Γ is the collection of two algorithms:
Distribution Algorithm:This algorithm has to be run in a secure
environment by a trustworthy party called Dealer. The algorithm
uses the function f ,which for a given secret K ∈ K and a par-
ticipant Pi ∈ P , assigns a set of shares from the set S that is
f(K,Pi) = Si ⊆ S for i = 1, . . . , n.
f : K ×P =⇒ 2S
Recovery Algorithm:This algorithm has to be executed collec-
tively by cooperating participants or by the combiner ,which can
be considered as a process embedded in a tamper proof module
and all participants have access to it.The combiner outputs the gen-
erated result via secure channels to cooperating participants.The
combiner applies the function
g : St =⇒ K
, to calculate the secret.For any authorized set of participants
g(S1, . . . , St) = K if P1, . . . , Pt ⊆ Γ.If the group of participant
belongs to an unauthorized set, the combiner fails to compute the
secret.
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A secret sharing scheme is called perfect if for all sets B, B ⊂ P
and B /∈ Γ, if participants in B pool their shares together they
cannot reduce their uncertainty about K. That is, H(K) = H(K |
SB),where SB denote the collection of shares of the participants
in B.It is known that for a perfect secret sharing scheme H(Si) ≥
H(K).If H(Si) = H(K) then the secret sharing scheme is called
ideal.
An access structure Γ1 is minimal if Γ2 ⊂ Γ1 and Γ2 ∈ Γ implies
that Γ2 = Γ1.Only monotone access structure is considered for the
construction of the scheme in which Γ1 ∈ Γ and Γ1 ⊂ Γ2 implies
Γ2 ∈ Γ.The collection of minimal access sets uniquely determines
the access structure.The access structure is the closure of the min-
imal access set.The access structure Γ in terms of minimal access
structure is represented by Γmin(Γ0).
For an access structure Γ, the family of unauthorized sets Γc =
2P \ Γ has the property that given an unauthorized set B ∈ Γc
then any subset C ⊂ B is also an unauthorized set.An immediate
consequence of this property is that for any access structure Γ, the
set of unauthorized sets can be uniquely determined by its maximal
set.Γcmax is used to denote the representation of Γc in terms of
maximal set.
For all B ∈ Γ.If |B| ≥ t then the access structure corresponds to
a (t, n) threshold scheme.In the (t, n) threshold scheme t or more
participant can reconstruct the secret.
The section 2 gives an introduction of threshold secret sharing, sec-
tion 3 explores the secret sharing technique based on generalized
access structure,section 4 gives different multi secret sharing tech-
niques.Section 5 deals with the proposed scheme.Section 6 is the
analysis of the scheme.Conclusion and references are given in sec-
tion 7 and 8.
2. THRESHOLD SECRET SHARING
Development of secret sharing scheme started as a solution to the
problem of safeguarding cryptographic keys by distributing the key
among n participants and t or more of the participants can recover it
by pooling their shares.Thus the authorized set is any subset of par-
ticipants containing more than t members.This scheme is denoted
as (t, n) threshold scheme.
The notion of a threshold secret sharing scheme is independently
proposed by Shamir [39] and Blakley [6] in 1979.Since then much
work has been put into the investigation of such schemes.Linear
constructions were most efficient and widely used.A threshold se-
cret sharing scheme is called perfect, if less than t shares give no in-
formation about the secret.Shamir’s scheme is perfect while Blak-
ley’s scheme is non perfect.Both the Blakley and the Shamir con-
structions realize t-out-of-n shared secret schemes.However, their
constructions are fundamentally different.
Shamir’s scheme is based on polynomial interpolation over a finite
field. It uses the fact that we can find a polynomial of degree t− 1
given t data points. A polynomial f(x) =
∑t−1
i=0 aix
i
, with a0 is
set to the secret value and the coefficients a1 to at−1 are assigned
random values in the field.The value f(i) is given to the user i as
a share. When t out of n users come together they can reconstruct
the polynomial using Lagrange interpolation and hence obtain the
secret.
Blakley’s secret sharing scheme has a different approach and is
based on hyperplane geometry. To implement a (t, n) threshold
scheme, each of the n users is given a hyper-plane equation in a
t dimensional space over a finite field such that each hyperplane
passes through a certain point. The intersection point of these hy-
perplanes is the secret. When t users come together, they can solve
the system of equations to find the secret.
McEliece and Sarwate [31] made an observation that Shamir’s
scheme is closely related to Reed-Solomon codes [38].The error
correcting capability of this code can be translated into desirable
secret sharing properties.
Karnin et al [27] realize threshold schemes using linear codes.
Massey [30] introduced the concept of minimal code words, and
provided that the access structure of a secret sharing scheme based
on a [n, k] linear code is determined by the minimal codewords of
the dual code.
Number theoretic concepts are also introduced for threshold se-
cret sharing scheme. The Mingotee scheme [32] is based on mod-
ulo arithmetic and Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). A spe-
cial sequence of integers called Mingotte sequence is used here.
The shares are generated using this sequence. The secret is recon-
structed by solving the set of congruence equation using CRT. The
Mingotte’s scheme is not perfect. A perfect scheme based on CRT
is proposed by Asmuth and Bloom [1]. They also uses a special
sequence of pairwise coprime positive integers.
Kothari[28] gave a generalized threshold scheme. A secret is rep-
resented by a scalar, and a linear variety is chosen to conceal the
secret. A linear function known to all trustees is chosen and is fixed
in the beginning, which is used to reveal the secret from the linear
variety. The n shadows are hyperplanes containing the liner vari-
ety. Moreover the hyper planes are chosen to satisfy the condition
that, the intersection of less than t of them results in a linear va-
riety which projects uniformly over the scalar field by the linear
function used for revealing the secret. The number t is called the
threshold. Thus as more shadows are known more information is
revealed about the linear variety used to keep the secret, however no
information is revealed until the threshold number of shadows are
known. He had shown that Blakley’s scheme and Karnin’s scheme
are equivalent and provided algorithms to convert one scheme to
another. He also stated that the schemes are all specialization of
generalized linear threshold scheme. Brickell[8] also give a gen-
eralized notion of Shamir and Blackley’s schemes using vector
spaces.
Researchers have investigated (t, n) threshold secret sharing
extensively.Threshold schemes that can handle more complex
access structures have been described by Simmons [41] like
weighted threshold schemes, hierarchical scheme,compartmental
secret sharing etc.They were found a wide range of useful appli-
cations.Sreekumar et al [42] in 2009, developed threshold schemes
based on Visual cryptography.
3. GENERALIZED SECRET SHARING
In the previous section, we mentioned that any t of the n partici-
pants should be able to determine the secret. A more general situ-
ation is to specify exactly which subsets of participants should be
able to determine the secret and which subset should not.In this sec-
tion we give the secret sharing constructions based on generalized
access structure.
Shamir [39] discussed the case of sharing a secret between the ex-
ecutives of a company such that the secret can be recovered by
any three executives, or by any executive and any vice-president,
or by the president alone. This is an example of hierarchical secret
sharing scheme. The Shamir’s solution for this case is based on an
ordinary (3,m) threshold secret sharing scheme. Thus, the presi-
dent receives three shares, each vice-president receives two shares
and, finally, every executive receives a single share.
The above idea leads to the so-called weighted(or multiple shares
based) threshold secret sharing schemes. In these schemes, the
shares are pairwise disjoint sets of shares, provided by an ordinary
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threshold secret sharing scheme. Benaloh and Leichter have proven
in [4] that there are access structures that can not be realized using
such scheme.
Several researchers address this problem and introduced secret
sharing schemes realizing the general access structure.The most ef-
fecient and easy to implement scheme was Ito, Saito,Nishizeki’s
[23] construction.It is based on Shamir’s scheme.The idea is to dis-
tribute shares to each authorized set of participants using multiple
assignment scheme, where more than one share is assigned to a par-
ticipant if he belongs to more than one minimal authorized subset.
A simple scheme is mentioned by Beimel [2], in which the se-
cret S ∈ 0, 1 and let Γ be any monotone access structure. The
dealer shares the secret independently for each authorized set B ∈
Γ,where B = {Pi1, . . . , Pil}. The Dealer chooses l − 1 random
bits r1, . . . , rl−1. Compute rl = S ⊕ r1 ⊕ r2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ rl−1, and the
Dealer distributes share rj to Pij . For each set B ∈ A, the random
bits are chosen independently and each set in Γ can reconstruct the
secret by computing the exclusive-or of the bits given to the set.The
unauthorized set cannot do so.
The disadvantage with multiple share assignment scheme is that
the share size depends on the number of authorized set that contain
Pj .A simple optimization is to share the secret S only for minimal
authorized sets.Still this scheme is inefficient for access structures
in which the number of minimal set is big ( Eg:(n/2, n) scheme
).The share size grows exponentially in this case.
Benalohand Leichter [4] developed a secret sharing scheme for an
access structure based on monotone formula.This generalizes the
multiple assignment scheme of Ito,Saito and Nishizeki [23].The
idea is to translate the monotone access structure into a monotone
formula.Each variable in the formula is associated with a trustee in
P and the value of the formula is true if and only if the set of vari-
ables which are true corresponds to a subset of P which is in the
access structure. This formula is then used as a template to describe
how a secret is to be divided into shares.
Brickell [9]developed some ideal schemes for generalized access
structure using vector spaces.Stinson [43] introduced a monotone
circuit construction based on monotone formula and also the con-
struction based on public distribution rules.Benaloh’s scheme was
generalized by Karchmer and Wigderson [26],who showed that if
an access structure can be described by a small monotone span pro-
gram then it has an efficient scheme.
Cumulative schemes were first introduced by Ito et al [23] and then
used by several authors to construct a general scheme for arbitrary
access structures.Simmons [41] proposed cumulative map, Jackson
[24] proposed a notion of cumulative array.Ghodosi et al [17] intro-
duced simpler and more efficient scheme and also introduced capa-
bilities to detect cheaters. Generalized cumulative arrays in secret
sharing is introduced by Long [29].
4. MULTI SECRET SHARING
There are several situations in which more than one secret is to be
shared among participants.As an example, consider the following
situation, described by [41] .There is a missile battery and not all
of the missiles have the same launch enable code. A scheme is to
be devised which will allow any selected subset of users to enable
different launch code.The problem is to devise a scheme which will
allow any one,or any selected subset, of the launch enable codes to
be activated in this scheme.This problem could be trivially solved
by realizing different secret sharing schemes, one for each of the
launch enable codes, but this solution is clearly unacceptable since
each participant should remember too much information. What is
really needed is an algorithm such that the same pieces of private
information could be used to recover different secrets.
One common drawback of all secret sharing scheme is that, they
are one-time schemes.That is once a qualified group of participants
reconstructs the secret K by pooling their shares, both the secret
K and all the shares become known to everyone, and there is no
further secret.In other words, each share kept by each participant
can be used to reconstruct only one secret.
Karnin, Greene and Hellman [27] in 1983 mentioned the multiple
secret sharing scheme where threshold number of users can recon-
struct multiple secrets at the same time. Alternatively the scheme
can be used to share a large secret by splitting it into smaller
shares.Franklin et al [15], in 1992 used a technique in which the
polynomial-based single secret sharing is replaced with a scheme
where multiple secrets are kept hidden in a single polynomial.They
also considered the case of dependent secrets in which the amount
of information distributed to any participant is less than the infor-
mation distributed with independent schemes.Both the schemes are
not perfect. They are also one time threshold schemes. That is, the
shares cannot be re used.
Blundo et al [7],in 1993 considered the case in which m secrets are
shared among participants in a single access structure Γ, in such
a way that any qualified set of participants can reconstruct the se-
cret.But any unqualified set of participants knowing the value of
number of secrets might determine some( possibly no)information
on other secrets.Jackson et al [25], in 1994 considered the situa-
tion in which there is a secret SK associated with each K-subset
of participants and SK can be reconstructed by any group of t par-
ticipants in K (t ≤ K).That is each subset of K participants is
associated with a secret which is protected by a (t,K)-threshold
access structure. These schemes are called multi-secret threshold
schemes.They came up with a combinatorial model and an opti-
mum threshold multi secret sharing scheme.Information theoretic
model similar to threshold scheme is also proposed for multi-secret
sharing.They have generalized and classified the multi-secret shar-
ing scheme based on the following facts.
—should all the secrets be available for potential reconstruction
during the lifetime of the scheme, or should the access of secrets
be further controlled by enabling the reconstruction of a particu-
lar secret only after extra information has been broadcast to the
participants.
—whether the scheme can be used just once to enable the secrets
or should the scheme be designed to enable multiple use.
—If the scheme is used more than once then the reconstructed se-
cret or shares of the participants is known to all other participants
or it is known to only the authorized set.
—The access structure is threshold or generalized in nature.
In 1994 He and Dawson [21] proposed the general implementation
of multistage secret sharing.The proposed scheme allows many se-
crets to be shared in such a way that all secrets can be reconstructed
separately.The implementation uses Shamir’s threshold scheme and
assumes the existence of a one way function which is hard to in-
vert.The public shift technique is used here.A t − 1 degree poly-
nomial f(x) is constructed first, as in Shamir’s scheme.The public
shift values are di = zi−yi.where zi = f(xi).The yi’s are send to
the participants secretly.For sharing the next secret h(yi) is used,
where h is the one way function.The secrets are reconstructed in
particular order, stage by stage and also this scheme needs kn pub-
lic values corresponds to the k secrets.The advantage is that each
participant has to keep only one secret element and is of the same
size as any shared secret.In 1995 Harn [20] shows an alternative
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implementation of multi stage secret sharing which requires only
k(n − t) public values.The implementation become very attrac-
tive, especially when the threshold value t is very close to the num-
ber of participants n.That is for multistage (n, n) secret sharing.In
this scheme an (n − 1) degree polynomial f(x) is evaluated at
(n− t) points and are made public.Any t participants can combine
their shares with the (n− t) public shares to interpolate the degree
(n−1) polynomial.Multiple secrets are shared with the help of one
way function as in He and Dawson scheme.
The desirable properties of a particular scheme depends on both
the requirements of the application and also the implementa-
tion.Several multi secret threshold schemes are developed by the
research community.In the proposed scheme we considered a
multi-secret sharing scheme, realizing general access structure.
A computationally secure secret sharing scheme with general
access structure, where all shares are as short as the secret is
proposed by Christian Cachin [10] in 1995.The scheme also
provides capability to share multiple secrets and to dynamically
add participants on-line without having to redistribute new shares
secretly to the current participants.These capabilities are achieved
by storing additional authentic information in a publicly accessible
place which is called a noticeboard or bulletin board.This informa-
tion can be broadcast to the participants over a public channel.The
protocol gains its security from any one-way function.Multi secret
sharing in this scheme needs different one way functions.The
shares are exposed during the reconstruction and hence cannot
be reused.A distributed evaluation sub protocol is proposed by
Goldreich et al [18] using one way function, but this allows the
secret to be reconstructed in a specified order.
Pinch [37] in 1996 proposed a modified algorithm based on the
intractability of the Diffie-Hellman problem, in which arbitrary
number of secrets can be reconstructed without having to redis-
tribute new shares.This scheme is multi use but the participant
has to follow a sequence.Ghodosi et.al [16] showed that Pinch’s
scheme is vulnerable to cheating and they modified the scheme to
include cheating prevention technique. Yeun et al.,[46] proposed
a modified version of the Pinch’s protocol which identifies all
cheaters, regardless of their number, improving on previous results
by Pinch and Ghodosi et al.
An efficient computationally secure on-line secret sharing scheme
is proposed by Re-Junn Hwang and Chin-Chen Chang in [22] 1998
.In this each participant hold a single secret which is as short as
the shared secret.They are selected by the participants itself so a
secure channel is not required between the dealer and the partic-
ipants.Participants can be added or deleted and secrets can be re-
newed with out modifying the secret share of the participants.The
shares of the participants is kept hidden and hence can be used to
recover multi secrets.The scheme is multi use unlike the one time
use multi secret sharing scheme.
In Pinch’s scheme high computation over head is involved and also
sequential reconstruction is used in the recovery phase.In 1999 Sun
[44] proposed a scheme having the advantages of lower compu-
tation overhead and parallel reconstruction in the secret recovery
phase.The security of the scheme is only based on one-way func-
tion,not on any other intractable problem. In 2006 Pang et al [35]
[36] proposed efficient and secure multi secret sharing with general
access structures.The proposed scheme is a modification based on
this scheme. An efficient, renewable, multi use, multi-secret shar-
ing scheme for general access structure is proposed by Angsuman
Das and Avishek Adhikari [13] in 2010 .The scheme is based on
one way hash function and is computationally more efficient.Both
the combiner and the participants can also verify the correctness of
the information exchanged among themselves in this.
5. PROPOSED SCHEME
The scheme is based on Shamir and discrete logarithm problem.
The shares are generated by the participants and hence there is no
need for a secure channel between the dealer and the participant.
The pseudoshares are send to the dealer and it is difficult to get the
shares from the pseudo shares because of the complexity of the dis-
crete logarithm problem.Shared secret, participants set and access
structures can be changed dynamically without updating partici-
pants secret shares.The degree of the polynomial is only one,so the
computational complexity is also less.
5.1 initialization Phase
Let P = P1, P2, . . . , Pn be the set of participants.K1,K2, . . . ,Kk
be the set of secrets to be shared according to the access structure
Γ1,Γ2, . . . ,Γk, where Γi = {γi1, γi2, . . . , γit} is the access
structure corresponds to the secret Ki.
Select two large prime p and q and let n = p× q.Randomly select
an integer g from [
√
n, n] such that g 6= p or g 6= q.Choose another
prime m larger than n. The dealer publishes g, n,m on the public
bulletin.Each participant randomly select an integer si from [2, n]
as secret share and compute psi = gsi mod n.The pseudo shares
psi are send to the dealer,who will then publish them in the public
bulletin board.
5.2 Secret Sharing
In this phase, the dealer share the secrets corresponds to each ac-
cess structure by publishing the values in the bulletin board, which
is used by the participants to later reconstruct the secret.
Dealer randomly select an integer s0i from [2, n] such that s0i
is relatively prime to φ(n) and compute ps0i = gs0i mod n
corresponds to each secret Ki.Find h0i such that s0i × h0i ≡
1 mod φ(n).
Select an integer a from [1, m − 1] and construct a polynomial
fi(x) = Ki+a×x mod m. Select t distinct random integers from
di1, di2, . . . , dit from [1,m − 1] to denote the t qualified sets in
Γi.Compute fi(1) and for each subset γij = {P1j , P2j , . . . , Plj}
compute
Hij = fi(dij)
⊕
pss0i1 mod n
⊕
pss0i2 mod n
⊕
. . .
⊕
pss0il mod n
The dealer then publish
ps0i, h0i, fi(1),Hi1,Hi2, . . . ,Hit, di1, di2, . . . , dit
corresponds to each secret Ki and the access structure Γi. The
dealer also publishes F (Ki, dij) corresponds to each secret and
each authorized access set which can be used by the participant for
verification after the secret recovery,where F is a two variable one
way function.
5.3 Secret Reconstruction
The participants from any authorized subset (Γi) can reconstruct
the secret Ki as follows.
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If γij = {P1ij , P2ij , . . . , Plij} want to reconstruct Ki, each par-
ticipant compute xkij = ps0ski , k = 1, . . . , l.These values are then
delivered to the designated combiner. The combiner computes
fi(dij)′ = Hij
⊕
x1ij
⊕
x2ij
⊕
. . .
⊕
xlij
.Using fi(1) , fi(dij)′ and dij ’s, he can reconstruct the polynomial
and hence recover the secret.
fi(x) = fi(1)× (x− dij)
1− dij + fi(dij)′ ×
(x− 1)
dij − 1
=
x × fi(1)− dij × fi(1)− x× f(dij)′+ f(dij)′
1− dij
The shared secret Ki = fi(0). Each participant of the authorized
set can exchange xij with other participants in the group and each
member can compute the secret individually.This doesn’t need a
specified combiner and it also avoids the transmission of secret
from the combiner to the participant.Each participant can verify
the given xij by the other participants and also the recovered secret
by using the public values.
6. ANALYSES AND DISCUSSIONS
In the proposed scheme, the degree of the used Lagrange poly-
nomial f(x) is only 1,and we can construct f(x) very easily.The
other operation is just XOR operation which can also be computed
very efficiently.Each participant select his share and compute the
pseudo share psi = gsi mod q.This avoids the computational
quantity of the dealer.This also avoids the need for a secure
channel. The proposed scheme does not need special verification
algorithm to check whether each participant cheats or not.In
the secret reconstruction phase the combiner can check whether
xi is a true share by checking xh0ii = psi mod m.That is
xh0ii = (ps0i)
si)h0i = (gs0ih0i )si = gsi = psi mod m.Each
participant can verify the secret after recovery by computing the
two variable one way function F (Ki, dij) and compare the result
with the public value.
In the reconstruction phase, each participant Pij in γij only
provides a public value xij and he does not have to reveal the
secret share si.It is difficult to get the secret share from the public
value xij and psi,because the discrete logarithm problem is hard
to solve.The scheme is computationally secure.The shares can be
reused and hence the scheme is a multi use scheme.The polynomial
f(x) can be reconstructed only if two pints are known.The point
(1, f(1)) is known publicly but the second point can be obtained
only by the authorized set of participants using their private shares.
The important property of the proposed scheme is that the shared
secret, the participant set and the access structure can be changed
dynamically without updating any participant’s secret shadow.In
order to update the secret, the dealer need to create a new poly-
nomial f(x) and update f(1).If a new qualified set is to be added
thenHt+1 and dt+1 need to be added.New participant can be added
accordingly.The public information corresponds to each modified
authorized set must be recomputed and the old information must
be updated in the public bulletin.Deleting a participant or delet-
ing the authorized set containing the participant needs, deleting the
public information corresponding to the access set.However for se-
curity reasons the secret also need to be updated.The scheme has
following important properties.
(1) The scheme can share multiple secrets, each with a specified
access structure.
(2) The participant has to hold only a single share in order to share
multiple secrets.
(3) The size of the share is as short as the secret
(4) Participants select their secret shares and the dealer need not
know the shares of the participants.This avoids the need of a
secure channel.
(5) The scheme is multi use ie; the participants can reuse the shares
after a secret is recovered.
(6) Each participant can verify the shares provided by the others
in the recovery phase.
(7) The dealer can modify the secret or add new secret with out
modifying the participants secret shadow.
(8) After the secret is recovered, the participants can verify the
validity of the recovered secret.
(9) The access structures can be dynamically modified.Only the
public values need to be modified in this case also.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper an efficient multi secret sharing scheme with a gen-
eralized access structure is proposed.The scheme is multi use and
hence the shares can be reused by the participants.The participant
select their secret shadows and the secret can be reconstructed
by any participant in the authorized subset.No secure channel is
required because the secrets or the secret shares are never send
through the channel.The scheme is also verifiable because each
participant can verify the shares of the other participants during
the reconstruction phase and also the participants can verify the
reconstructed secret.The shared secret, access structure or the par-
ticipants set can be dynamically modified with out modifying the
participants secret shadow.The scheme is also computationally ef-
ficient and can be implemented easily.
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